review in Papers 4, but have not previously been published. The three letters from Meinong, Ameseder and Mally are translated and published here in their entirety for the first time, with a corrected translation of a response to Meinong from Russell. 3 Transcriptions of the German originals are appended to the electronic edition of this paper.
Russell made fourteen leaves of notes that he numbered 1 through 14. These appear to have been written consecutively as he worked his way through the book, although he had seen Meinong's Chapter i, Chapters ii and viii by Ameseder, and apparently Chapter iii by Mally, separately before he received the whole collection. The body of the notes for the book, which are here listed by the numbers of the pages from which they are taken, is limited to those chapters. Although Russell had read offprints (or drafts or proofs) of those four chapters in advance, presumably he took the notes after the book was printed with the page numbers to which the notes are keyed.
There is a separate summary of Chapter iv, "Ueber Oekonomie des Denkens" by Wilhelm Frankl on folio 13 of the notes which contains one reference to a page number. The other articles are only listed by title at the end of the notes.
Russell's copy of Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie contains only one marginal marking-in Mally's article (next to the discussion of the Sein and Sosein of the round square on page 128)-out of the four that he had received before the book appeared. Of the articles he saw for the first time in the published book, there are markings only in those by Frankl, Benussi and Saxinger. They are on explicitly psychological topics. Meinong published Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie to mark the tenth anniversary of his founding in 1894 of the "Psychological Laboratory" at the University of Graz. He had been a student under Franz Brentano and then a Privatdozent at the University of Vienna in 1874-89, when he took up his position at Graz. Several of the leading members of the "Austrian School" of psychology that Brentano had founded, including Stephan Witasek, Christian von Ehrenfels and Vittorio Benussi, were students respondence" (Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, Russell's Dialogue, p. 86) , but that "neither letter appears to have survived" (Papers 4: 666) . The letters were always in the Russell Archives, but the signatures presented difficulties. 3 In "Russell's Study of Meinong", Eames presented an overview of ra material relating Russell and Meinong in 1971 . The findings of this paper and its companion in the previous issue of Russell confirm her assessment of the documents. of Meinong at Graz. Benussi contributed three psychological essays to the volume. Mally and Ameseder wrote philosophical essays, however, and it is those, along with the introductory essay by Meinong, which attracted most of Russell's attention in the review.
significance of the notes and correspondence
The letters and notes are of value for the light they shed on Russell's composition of the review and provide important information for interpreting the references to Meinong in "On Denoting", published in the same issue of Mind. The notes reveal that Russell concentrated his attention on the first three philosophical articles, by Meinong, Ameseder and Mally, although he read through the psychological papers in the rest of the volume. The notes address a number of technical issues in Meinong's philosophy and contain the logical objections to nonexistent objects as they occurred to him in the reading. It appears that once Ameseder had confirmed that "the present King of France" is to denote a non-existent object, Russell settled on the examples that illustrate the objections as they appear in the review. He first used this example in print in "On Denoting". The focus of the review on these articles, and then the distribution of attention to the rest of the book, are reflected in the notes, which he followed while composing the review. In "On Denoting" he presented his famous theory of descriptions, and argued for it both as a solution to his three "puzzles" about the logical form of sentences using definite descriptions, but also as an improvement on the rival theories of Gottlob Frege and Meinong. The dismissal of Meinong occurs in this memorable paragraph:
The evidence for the above theory is derived from the difficulties which seem unavoidable if we regard denoting phrases as standing for genuine constituents of the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur. Of the possible theories which admit such constituents the simplest is that of Meinong. This theory regards any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for an object. Thus "the present King of 4 For an account of Meinong's school see the chapter "Act Psychology and the Aus- France", "the round square", etc., are supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This is in itself a difficult view; but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also not round; etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred. ( Papers 4: 418) Another reference to Meinong occurs near the end of "On Denoting" in a comparison with MacColl, who distinguishes between real and unreal objects:
This assumes that such phrases as "the present King of France", which do not denote a real individual, do, nevertheless, denote an individual, but an unreal one. This is essentially Meinong's theory, which we have seen reason to reject because it conflicts with the law of contradiction. ( Papers 4: 426) The correspondence between Russell and three of the authors, Meinong, Ameseder and Mally, adds to our understanding of the origin of these brief statements in "On Denoting", which was written in July 1905. III has not yet arrived.)] I find myself in almost complete agreement with the general viewpoint, and the problems dealt with seem to me very important. I myself have been accustomed to use the name "Logic" for what you call "Theory of Objects"; and the reasons you cite against this use on p. 20 ff. appear to me hardly decisive. Still, this is a matter of secondary importance; and I admit that a new viewpoint should be signified by a new name.
I have always believed until now that every object must be [sein] in some sense, and I find it difficult to recognize non-existent [nichtseinde] objects. In a case such as the golden mountain or the round square one must distinguish between sense and reference (in accordance with Frege's distinction): the sense is an object, and has being, whereas the reference on the other hand is not an object. One sees the difference between sense and reference best in mathematical examples: "The positive square root of 4" is a complex sense, whose reference is the number 2.
I am in complete agreement with the view that mathematics is object theory; this is in fact one of the main theses of my "Principles". If you do not possess the book, I shall gladly send it to you. Its entire first part is explicitly concerned with questions concerning object theory. Of course there are many discussions whose purpose is purely formal, that is, only as preliminary to lead into technical mathematical developments; yet the general questions are the essential matters treated there.
I find a certain difficulty with what you say about metaphysics on p. 40, although I agree with the main thesis: it seems to me that we cannot be instructed about all that exists from the empirical; consequently, if there is a metaphysics, it must be of must exist in some sense, and proposes Frege' Highly honoured Sir! Your friendly letter was extremely pleasing and I must ask your forgiveness for only now answering it. This has happened because I first had to reflect on the points that you raise in your letter; however, I was not able to get very far with that.
To begin with, I cannot decide whether a mathematical function is an objective [Objektiv] ; I had an inclination to treat them as a "Relat", because a function does not seem to be a being itself. Admittedly you present the propositional function as an objective, and it clearly constitutes only a special case of an objective. My account of pure [reine] and unobjectified objectives [nicht vergegenständlichen Objektives] is unfortunately very defective. I find it necessary to distinguish these two, and this is not made express in my work. I obtain a pure objective-psychologically speaking-when I abstract from its objects, for example, in the case where a is b, I abstract from a and b; the objectless, on the other hand, is one which has no a or b at all, and that obviously cannot be.
Objects, such as sin /2, I also would not consider objectives but rather "common primary objects of objective complexes" [gemeinsame primäre Gegenstände von Objektiv komplexen] .
Our difference with respect to non-existent and impossible objects must derive from the defects of my formulation, as I want to hold onto my correctness in the matter. When I speak of "the present King of France", I still speak of something [etwas] , and, namely, of something that is not. Such a something that is not, is a something in spite of that, and hence, an object [Gegenstand ] , and if you will not admit this, then I would gladly speak of the "theory of somethings'' [Theorie der Etwasse] instead of "object theory" if that were proper language. By the way, "something" seems completely indistinguishable from "object". Once one has acknowledged non-existing objects as objects then it is naturally only a small step further to objects which cannot exist. I believe that of an à priori nature.
I hope that your philosophical methods will soon be widely known, and it will be a pleasure to me to contribute to this as much as possible.
Respectfully yours, Bertrand Russell. Logic was originally published in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. In the second, 1840, version published in London by Richard Griffin, at p. 25 the example is corrected to "the present ex-King of France". then had an Emperor.
Apparently Russell had presented the example "the present King of France" to Ameseder, as an example of a contingently non-existing object, like "the Golden Mountain", and unlike the impossible "round square". This letter has not been found. When he composed "On Denoting" in July 1905, he could thus base his attribution of this view to Meinong on the basis of Ameseder's explicit statement. There is no mention in Ameseder's letter of any acknowledgement that these "things that are not" produce violations of the law of contradiction.
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That is Russell's argument in the review. It is the basis for the second of the three puzzles in "On Denoting", namely that sentences about non-existents will also violate the law of the excluded middle, for the "present King of France" will be neither bald nor not bald.
The letter from Mally is dated 11 April 1905 and is devoted principally to explaining the notion of "implicit" and "explicit" objects and uses the example of the "number greater than 5" which appears in the notes and in the review. The notes also mention (pp. 50, 57 below) the Mally letter
Graz, Rechbauerstrasse 15 Very honoured Sir! I have hesitated so long over my answer to your kind letter of February 27, because I hoped and in the meantime also endeavoured to find a satisfactory answer to your questions. I cannot now assess whether I have succeeded in this and ask you to let me know your own judgment of these results.
First of all, with respect to non-existing objects [nichtbestehenden Gegenstände], I can only say this: the assertion of any non-being has only a determinate sense when the non-being of something is asserted. The nonbeing needs an object, that is not, for its being as much as being needs an object, that is, for its being. Every non-being, that factually is, is the non-being of something, an A or an X, etc. I call this something an object 13 Nicholas Griffin has pointed out a reference to discussions with Whitehead over "whether the present King of France is bald" in a letter from Russell to Alys on 9 April 1904, so Mally's letter does not have Russell's first recorded use of this example. See SLBR 1: 277. 14 My translation. I am grateful to Ingo Brigandt and Johannes Brandl for assistance with the transcription of the handwritten letter, filed at ra1 710.053726. Brandl and Susanne Riehemann helped with the translation. A section on "Vor-und nachgegebene Objective" begins on p. 61.
[Gegenstand ]. It will be granted that a non-existing object can be an object of our thought. For example, if I assert that there is no real square root of a negative number, I judge about the "real square root of a negative number", and this is the object of my judgment. Given the fact, however, that something is or may be the object of a judgment, it certainly is an object, regardless of whether it happens to exist or not, for it is not "made" into an object through the judgment about it.
The "fictitious" [fiktiven] objects, also, are perhaps best characterized from the psychological side, even though I do not mean by that that they are somehow dependent on the psychological. If I think, for example, "number that is greater than 5," the immediate object of my thought, that which is fully adequate to my thought, is not 6, nor 7, nor any specific number, of which one can say, when it is given, that it is greater than 5. This immediate and adequate [unmittelbare adäquate] object of my thought is also not the totality of the objects 6, 7, 8, etc., but indeed the "explicit" [explizite] object, "number which is greater than 5".
With this general object (which is perhaps what one means when one speaks of the "concept" "number that is greater than 5", when that is not meant as something psychological) there coincide infinitely many actual ("implicit" [implizite] or "concrete" [konkrete]) objects, for example 6, 7, 8, …. That is to say, there obtains the objective "6 is a number that is greater than 5" or "7 > 5", etc. If I now think: "a specific number that is greater than 5", the immediate and completely adequate object of my thought, again, is not 6, 7, or 8, …, and also not simply the "general"[allgemeine] or "explicit" object "number, that is greater than 5", but precisely "determinate [bestimmte] (concrete) number that is greater than 5." That is to say, my thinking concerns as before the explicit or general object, but adds, by making the assumption, the determination that it is concrete or "implicit". That, which I think of in such a way, is now a fictitious object. This corresponds to the definition: an explicit object with the determination that it is implicit, is a fictitious object. This determination, to be implicit (or concrete or factual [tatsächlich]), is (following the terminology of Ameseder's work) not later conjoined to the explicit object [nachgegeben] , for example, "number that is greater than 5", but given beforehand [vorgegeben] . By contrast, in the case of objects like 6 or 7, this determination is conjoined with these objects later; that is to say, it factually adheres [kommt zu] to a factual object.
With regard to your conception of magnitude, I am as of now not able to offer you any comments, as I am not yet acquainted enough with the English language.
Yours faithfully, Ernst Mally
After the letters and this review, Russell does not seem to have communicated much with Meinong or his school about these issues. Russell wrote short reviews of Meinong in 1906 and 1907, 15 and then no more articles on or reviews of his work. Meinong wrote a second edition of Ueber Annahmen in 1910 which contains numerous responses to Russell, mostly carried out in footnotes. 16 He does not seem to have responded to these objections, and apparently left the job of reviewing the second edition in Mind to C. D. Broad.
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This review, and the articles that it discusses, are thus the main source of information about the so-called "Russell-Meinong" debate over non-existent objects such as the "round square" and the "golden mountain". It is Russell's objections to these "Meinongian objects" and his desire to avoid them in his own ontology, that came to be seen as the upshot of his discussion of Meinong in "On Denoting," and, consequently, one of the prime motivations for Russell's theory of definite descriptions. It is indeed the account of objects [Objekte] that is the main topic of the review. As in the 1904 article "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", Russell also discusses Meinong's theory of assumptions, or propositions, with which he does largely agree. It is on the point that impossible objects-such as "the round square" and the objectives of false judgments, false propositions-are not existent [wirklich] and do not even have Sein or Bestehen [being or subsistence]-where Russell parts company with Meinong. It is Meinong's thesis that these objects are beyond being [Aussersein] to which Russell is primarily objecting. Meinong holds that one must distinguish the Sein of an object from its Sosein-as Russell puts it, the "being" of the object from its "being so-and-so". Thus an object may have a property (and be so-and-so) independently of its ontological status; indeed it can have properties without having any being at all. In particular an object may have inconsistent properties and consequently not subsist and not even possibly subsist.
After the great impact of "On Denoting", Russell's positive attitude He [Meinong] was perhaps the supreme entity-multiplier in the history of philosophy, and yet, I suppose, the main service which he really rendered philosophy was to force logicians to see that "wherever possible logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities."
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It is clear from this review, and Russell's three-part article the year before, that Meinong was of more interest to Russell than just showing the necessity of the theory of descriptions in "On Denoting" as the alternative to adopting an excessive ontology as a way of solving philosophical problems. Russell's principal objection to Meinong is based on his problem about the logical properties of non-existent objects, not simply on his ability to provide an analysis of sentences using definite descriptions that requires a lighter ontological commitment.
synopsis of the review
Russell begins the review by saying that from this large volume, which includes eleven essays by Alexius Meinong and his school, he will concentrate on the first three essays by Meinong, Ameseder and Mally, and the eighth, also by Ameseder.
19 These essays in particular develop the Object Theory (Gegenstandstheorie) of Meinong's earlier Ueber Annahmen, the subject of an article in Mind the year before. Russell cites Meinong's assertions that a round square is impossible and so "the round square" is an impossible object, while it is still necessary that the round square is round. He says (at Papers 4: 598):
It is not customary for philosophers to face the round square with so much courage; and indeed few logicians can withstand its onset. But if we are to be clear about the supposed non-subsistent objects, it is quite essential that we should have a satisfactory theory about the round The next paragraph contains the objections that have been the source of the literature which attempts to individuate and count "Russell's objections to Meinongian objects".
20 First he suggests the argument that there can be subsisting propositions about non-subsisting objects, which is incompatible with the view that objects are constituents of the propositions about them. (Russell himself had abandoned this view even before "On Denoting" by allowing that a proposition can be about an object that is not among its constituents by containing a denoting concept that is about the object.) Russell then says that the "chief objection" to Meinong's view is that his objects involve denying the law of non-contradiction. Consider impossible objects, A and B, impossible because A is both the same as B and not. Then "A differs from B" and "A does not differ from B" would seem to be both true, a true contradiction. Consequently we cannot count impossible objects, for there are both one object B and two, A and B. He adds to this perhaps the most famous objection:
And the difficulty is that impossible objects often subsist, and even exist. For if the round square is round and square, the existent round square is existent and round and square. Thus something round and square exists, although everything round and square is impossible. This ontological argument cannot be avoided by Kant's device of saying that existence is not a predicate, for Ameseder admits (p. 79) that "existing" applies when and only when "being actual (wirklich)" applies, and that the latter is a Sosein. Thus we cannot escape the consequence that "the existent God" both exists and is God; and it is hard to see how it can be maintained, as Mally implies (p. 133), that this has no bearing on the question whether God exists. In this passage is an important consideration in recent attempts to revive "neoMeinongian" theories of objects or deal with these phenomena with "free logic", by which sentences with non-referring singular terms can nevertheless be true. 21 He criticizes Mally's essay for introducing too many new notions without adequate definitions. One of these notions is the distinction between "explicit" and "implicit" objects. Russell must have questioned this notion in his letter to Mally, for he uses an example from Mally's response in his review. Russell says that "Number which is greater than 5" is an explicit object which is neither 6, nor 7, nor 8, etc. On the other hand 6 will be an implicit object of that expression. Russell rightly observes that the distinction seems to be like his own distinction between different ways concepts can denote objects. At this point he had still not abandoned his earlier notion of "denoting concept", which was to be the main conclusion of "On Denoting".
Russell then goes on to criticize Mally's theory of number, as the main topic of Mally's paper is the application of Object Theory to measurement, rather than a defence of impossible objects. Mally asserts that numbers apply to aggregates, rather than concepts or classes as with Frege and Russell. Ameseder's contribution on the theory of sensation presents a notion of "production" by which perceptual objects are constructed out of experience.
22 This has application to illusions, such as the "Müller-Lyer" diagram. The other articles that are mentioned at all in the review, by Benussi, Liel, Frankl and Saxinger, are then discussed briefly. The review closes with the judgment that the volume "does the highest credit to the Graz school of psychology and philosophy" and concludes that:
The 22 Russell mentioned this chapter two years later in the section iii he later deleted from "On the Nature of Truth" (Papers 5: 452n.) .
That first article has become a representative of Meinong's views from its translation as "The Theory of Objects" in Chisholm's volume, Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Russell's review closes with a view of Meinong more in keeping with Chisholm's placement of the essay in his collection, rather than as the model of ontological excess that he was for analytic philosophers after Ryle's review.
russell's marginalia in his copy
Russell's copy of Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie is number 2,877 in his library in the Bertrand Russell Archives. There are relatively few markings in the book, although they are distributed throughout the book. Russell inscribed his name, as "B. Russell", on the upper right of the title-page where "A. Meinong" is cited as editor. The next page states that the volume marks the tenth anniversary of the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Graz, and a brief preface describes it as the first psychological laboratory in Austria.
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There are no markings in the first two papers, by Meinong and Ameseder, which are the first 120 pages of the book. In the margins of Mally's article, a passage on pages 128-9 is marked in the margins and then is the subject of a note. Russell used marginal lines to indicate passages that might be the subject of a note, either on a second reading, or as he turned to make a note while reading.
There 
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Then follow fifteen passages marked in the margins up to page 416, with one comment of "Yes" next to a double line by the first paragraph of page 401, the passage he had noted in the previous marginal comment, and an arrow pointing to note 2 on page 414. The article "Die verschobene Schachbrettfigur" [The shifted chessboard figure] by Benussi and Liel is marked only with a marginal line next to the first two paragraphs. Chapter viii is by Ameseder and is unmarked. Ameseder's third article, Chapter ix, "Über die absolute Auffälligkeit der Farben" [On the absolute impression of colours], has marginal lines on pages 510 and 511. Liel's "Gegen eine voluntäristiche Begründung der Werttheorie" [Against a voluntary basis for the theory of value] has marginal lines on 530, 532, 533, 541, 542, 572, 573 and 577. The last contribution, "Ueber die Natur der Phantasiegefühle und Phantasiebegehrungen" [On the nature of fantasy feeling and desire], Chapter xi, by Saxinger, pages 579-606, has extensive markings and some marginal comments. There are marginal lines on 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587 (with a marginal question mark "?" on the last line of 587, and the underlined words "dieses erhält sich dauernd". Further marginal lines are on 589, 591, 594, 595, 596, 598, 599 (with "Don't agree" next to it), 600, 601 (with a corrected typo ["aufgeworfenen" changed to "aufgeworfene"]), and a "?" later on the page. On 602 there are three marginal lines, with "unconvincing" next to the last on lines 21-3, another correction ("geleistet" for "gleistet") on 603, and two marginal lines on the last page of the book, 606.
These markings and comments suggest that Russell had already read the four papers by Meinong, Ameseder and Mally that he had been sent earlier, although he read through the Mally paper again upon receiving the volume. He also read through the other papers dealing with purely psychological matters, paying attention to the results, and venturing his own opinions on matters of psychology, even though he made a firm distinction between logic and theory of knowledge on the one hand and "psychological" issues in his writings, and restricted himself to the former.
about the notes
The fourteen leaves of notes on Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie transcribed here are numbered xvi through xxix to indicate their placement in file ra1 230.030450, following the notes for Russell's 1904 paper "On Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions". They are numbered (foliated) consecutively in Russell's hand from 1 to 14, and that number appears on the right.
The fragment of notes (xvii verso) comes from Russell's reading of the last sections of Volume i of Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, from Russell's reading in the summer of 1902.
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Note contents that are cited within the review are indicated by *. There are a handful of page references in the published review that do not appear in the notes. They indicate that Russell looked through the texts again when writing, and did not solely rely on his notes. In the transcription his abbreviations are expanded, and all German terms are italicized. Some explanatory footnotes were needed.
text of russell's notes
Mally, letter to me.
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"Number which is > 5" is an explicit object, neither 6 nor 7 ... nor all together. 6, 7, ... are implicit or concrete objects, which coincide fully with "number > 5" "A particular number which > 5" is a fictitious object, not quite same as "number > 5". being so-and-so. Latter may subsist when object does not have being. The round square is certainly both round and square. [Is the existent God both existent and God?] p. 9* An object which is not is subject of proposition that it is not. We may say, if we like: "There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects." p. 10 If I say "blue does not exist", I am not talking of a presentation, but of blue itself. p. 11
We don't need a third kind of being, besides existence and subsistence. No use in a being to which no non-being is opposed. p. 12* Only strong argument for being of non-subsistent objects is that Objectives in which they are subjects subsist. This depends on regarding Objective as a complex, and subject as a constituent of it; but such a view is only to be taken figuratively. Thus being of Objective doesn't involve being of its subject.
Gegenstandstheorie not merely psychology. p. 20 May be identified with theory of objects of knowledge, without fear of undue limitation. p. 21 Not identified with pure logic, because this an essentially practical study; p. 26 Nor with theory of knowledge: this has two parts, one psychological, one theory of objects. Don't need to get at objects only by first studying knowledge.
p. 27 Mathematics essentially part of theory of objects. p. 28 At present mathematics is the only special science of this sort. p. 33 General theory of objects may learn from grammar, as special theory from mathematics. p. 36 Phenomena as such are a species of pseudo-existent objects. p. 38
Call metaphysics the general study of the real. p. 39 Every cognition 29 must have a subsistent Objective.
p. 40 Some judgments can be justified by the nature of their objects, others not; former à priori, latter empirical. Whatever can be known à priori about an object belongs to theory of objects. Thus 2 general studies:
(1) theory of objects, which is concerned with whatever can be given; (2) The Objective is not composed of 2 parts, the object and the rest, so that either could be alone. But it is complex, in the sense that each can be with another: if is , may have ′ is or is ′. The being would be an Objective free from , but doesn't subsist. p. 59 Pure Objective got by abstracting from object.-In " is ", is given before Objective, with it. is primary object, secondary.
p. 60 Call a complex of Objectives with a common object
Here it is to be shown
[This takes 23 pp.]
32 §172 Here the converse of the above is to be proved.
[This takes 14 pp.]
If we have ' .  . ' , and then we take the 's satisfying ' , the resulting ∧ ' , ' requires an of a certain class [ ̓ (∧ ' , ' )].
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Here ̓ ( ' ) are vorgegebene Objectives, ̓ ( ' ) nachgegebene. p. 62 E.g. "the table in my room is red"; here "being a table" and "being in my room" are vorgegeben, and "being red" is nachgegeben. p. 64 Can divide Objectives into positive and negative.-Existent and nonexistent are particular case of subsistent and non-subsistent.-Positive and negative are qualities of Objectives; not same as Yes and No, which belongs to Psychology. p. 66 All Objectives are facts or not-facts. Can't call anything else a fact; but may say an object has Tatsächlichkeit 34 when belongs to positive subsistence-Objective. p. 71
Relation of superius to inferiora. Besides this, superius involves a relation identical, wholly or partially, with itself.
31 This sheet of notes from Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik dates from 1902 and was being reused. See note 25. 32 Russell's "up down harpoon" in the formula would nowadays be replaced with a right arrow to indicate a mapping. It may derive from the koppa, an obsolete Greek letter used in geometry. 33 "∧ ' " is the logical product of the s (see PoM, Papers 4: 360, 5: 205 "Real = possible existent, ideal = everything else" is not a good division. Don't know whether existence is species of being, or being of a species of objects. p. 82* Divide objects into those whose being is necessary, possible and impossible. p. 83* The being of what is possible, if it is an Objekt, is existence (by Df ); but a possible Objective (e.g. the existence of a possible Objekt) is being. Causal necessity not included in above. p. 84* Only Objectives are necessary. p. 88* If is impossible, we may have both " differs from " and " does not differ from ", without 's being impossible.
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[Thus an object which does not subsist doesn't obey law of contradiction. Point out that non-subsistent subsistent objects are impossible, and yet subsist.]
35 "Connect with ontological argument" is written in the left-hand margin.
36 "This criticism is doubtful" also in left-hand margin. A being-so whose subsistence excludes that of its object is called contradictory. An object with a non-contradictory being-so is possible. "
The roundness of what is square" is an impossible being-so; but the roundness and squareness of the round square, though contradictory, are not impossible, but necessary. It is impossible a square should be round, but not that the round square should be round, which is necessary. p. 129 Call a possible object real (real ) if it can exist. p. 133* "Even if … in fact is not, it is yet tautologically certain that the being of … "the subsistent " subsists.〈"〉 By a judgment "the subsistent is" no more is judged about the (factual) being or not-being of … than by the hypothetical judgment: "if is, it is." … "The 'being and not-being' of the ' which is and is not' subsists.〈"〉 [I infer there are no non-entities.] p. 135 All objects which are determinations or determining objects of the same object form a system of coincident objects. E.g. if is a sphere and is red, being a sphere and being red as determinations, sphere and red as determining objects, lastly as object of determination, are coincident objects (of one system). Every being-so is either a quiddity or a quality.
( xxxiii ) 8 Meinong etc. Mally continued. p. 137* An Objective in the form " is" or "that is" or "that is " " is  " or "that is  " is an explicit Objective or determination.
[Translate Eigenschaftsgegenstand by subject.] The subject of an explicit Objective is an explicit subject. It has the form " which is" " which is ", etc. p. 138* A determination which coincides essentially with an explicit Objective without being one is to be called an implicit determination. Ditto for subjects. An explicit determination with the determination of being implicit is fictitious. An explicit subject with determination of being implicit is a coincides, as a complexion of the same inferiora. Hence an aggregatecomplex (Mengenkomplex) of its constituents coincides with every complex. p. 164* Plurality is an ideal complexion; for its constituents may be ideal. An aggregate-complex wholly determined by its complexion-i.e. an aggregate of wholly indeterminate objects-is a pure aggregate-complex. they are series of all magnitudes. p. 253 All pure quanta belong to 1 series: if we could determine them for quanta of different sorts, we could measure a quantum of one sort by one of another. p. 257 Measure-Objectives concerning pure quanta are pure, and belong to pure mathematics. p. 259 Mathematics deals with fictitious objects; theory of objects tries to reduce these to the most general groups of implicit objects.
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VIII.
Ameseder, Ueber Vorstellungensproduktion. p. 481* Sensations have objects and causes, but these are not identical. Objects neither physical nor psychical. p. 482* Objects of sensation are not dependent on sensation or on its causes. p. 483* The being of an object of sensation does not presuppose the being of anything else. Inner dependence belongs to founded objects and presentations which apprehend them. There can be no difference, without something different. p. 484 Presentation of a difference impossible without presentations of objects which are different. The presentations of the inferiora are a necessary constituent of presentation of superius.
[?] A perceptive presentation may have object of higher order, e.g. melody. p. 486 Presentations of independent objects may be called elementary presentations. p. 487 Presentation of difference of and is not founded, for nothing founded is actual. Nevertheless presentation of a complex is built on presentations of inferiora. How? p. 488 Call the process Production. What is produced is a presentation, not its object. p. 489 Whatever, in a perceptive presentation, is not sensation, must be produced. p. 496* The produced presentation seems to consist of the presentations of the inferiora in a real relation. p. 503 In such cases as Müller-Lyer's figure, the superius whose presentation is produced is compounded of presentations which are not those of the objects of the elementary presentations. Thus the presentation of the superius is inadequate to the isolated elementary presentations. p. 504-5
In Müller-Lyer's figure: The elementary presentations are still adequate to the inferiora; but by production they change so that they become inadequate to the previously-given objects, so that the presentation of the superius must also be inadequate. On Müller-Lyer's figure. Two attitudes: Be aware of whole figure, or as far as possible abstract from all but the line to be estimated. It appears that the more the figure is present to the mind, the greater the error. Inadequacies of sensation have following marks: (1) they depend on stimulus, and can't be modified by subject. (2) They are uniquely determined by stimulus. (3) Their magnitude has in principle no limits.
(4) They are not altered by practice. No one of these applies to our case. But our case fits perfectly with illusion of production. The illusion is not one of judgment, for it remains when we know the facts. It is the presentation of the figure that causes an apparent change of its constituents. p. 395* Contents in a real relation influence each other in the sense of their own nature. The presentation of shapes has this effect in a high degree, because it involves a real relation of the contents.
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VI.
Vittorio Benussi und Wilhelmine Liel, Die verschobene Schachbrattfigur.
Brings arguments similar to those of V to prove illusion of shifted chess-board also one of production.
VII.
Vittorio Benussi, a new proof of the specific brightness of colours.
IX.
Ameseder Ueber absolute Auffälligkeit der Farben, contends that Auffälligkeit is a specific quality determinable by experiment. X.
Wilhelmine Liel, Gengen eine voluntaristische Begründung der Werttheorie, polemic against Schwarz, arguing that value is based on feeling, not on conation.
XI.
Saxinfer, Ueber die Natur der Phantasiegefühle und Phantasiebegehrungen. Contends that both are facts sui generis, not reducible to feeling and desires proper, but related to these as assumptions to judgments. I differ on points of introspection: he says e.g. feelings proper weaken with time, not feelings of imagination.
